also deposited in the escrow account. There- fore, the sum of the money in the escrow is always higher than the IPO proceeds. Along with the right of every investor to redeem their shares upon merger, vote or liquidation, an escrow amount equaling or surpassing IPO funds guarantees that SPAC investors, retail or institutional, cannot lose any money. They are guaranteed to get their money back in its entirety. In addition, there is a small upside from warrant holdings. Therefore, SPACs are in their essence structured as a risk-free bond plus additional out-of-the-money warrant, with no risk to investors. The no- risk feature applies equally to all: institu- tional, retail, naïve, or skilled investor. Who and what makes investing in SPACs risk-free for all types of investors? The an- swer is simple. The only risk-takers from the IPO date until the SPAC merger deci- sion are SPAC sponsors and promoters. They provide at-risk capital by purchasing up-front IPO warrants, and pay for all un- derwriting costs, legal and accounting fees, listing expenses. If the SPAC were to liquidate, they would be the ones bearing the total cost. But isn’t the modern finance theory all about payoffs to risk? Taking the entire risk in the case of SPAC liquidation makes sense only if there is compensation for success in the form of acquisition. True: SPAC sponsors are well-compensated if the acquisition happens, and that is where they mostly exit. Consequently, after the merger, the original IPO SPAC is not a SPAC anymore, despite very often keeping its IPO name. It is a formerly private, now publicly listed company with cash infusion that many equate with SPACs. The no-risk feature of SPACs applies equally to all: institu tional, retail, naïve, or skilled investor. Grundlagen Fig. 2: IPO capital raised by IPO, USD billion n o i l l i B D S U 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2020: A strong year for traditional IPOs, stronger for SPACs 1 56 2 60 4 30 3 15 11 9 31 34 13 42 76 67 2013 2014 Traditional IPOs 2015 SPACs 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Source: Dealogic, Goldman Sachs Flobal Investment Research But that is comparing apples with or- anges. After the acquisition, original SPAC sponsors rarely, if at all, stay with the new company; instead, they often focus on bringing another SPAC shell public and finding another private company to list. Consider the examples of Alec Gores with a dozen of originated SPACs, Chamath Pali- hapitiya and his eight, Eric Rosenfeld and his seven, Dr. Marlene Krauss and her four. None of them are in the business nor re- sponsible for the long-term performance of their acquisition targets: they are simply the supply side of SPACs as a listing mech- anism and source of cash. But someone may be held responsible; underperformance of SPAC targets that af- ter the acquisition bear their IPO name must be explained adequately. Otherwise, SPACs would keep bearing an undeserved stigma. The answer may be on the demand side of the SPAC market. About two-thirds of SPACs at the IPO declare the focus of their acquisition. It is sometimes geographic (USA, China, Israel) and more frequently industry-based (health- care, services, technology, telecommuni- cations, finance). But there is no obligation to follow through on it. SPAC sponsors examine several targets and almost always find one willing to merge into an SPAC. Once they do, they publicize the letter of intent to merge, and the process starts. That process is very public: the SPAC files all required forms with the SEC, informs in- vestors of all the facts about targets and updates with any material change. At the same time, both markets for stock and war- rants are fully liquid and every investor can sell or buy. Typically, closing the merger takes six months, and as mentioned earlier, every investor besides the standard mar- ket has a chance to redeem the share with the funds from the escrow. Investors that do not sell and do not re- deem stay with the post-acquisition SPAC, and this post-acquisition SPAC is no differ- ent from any standard IPO company whose valuation is discovered in the market. The most frequent and most potent cri- tique of SPACs comes from underper- formance at this stage. SPACs sponsors are blamed for bringing lemons to the market, which lead to losses, especially for the re- tail investors. Funnily, the most active participants in the SPAC market, both pre- and post-merger, are hedge funds. Should we regulate the market and floor their losses, assuming they have incurred them? Or do we accept the SPACs as a class of financial assets that is freely tradable and therefore market reg- ulated without any regulatory intervention? It is hard to forecast what the SEC would do, but SPACs should certainly be left alone, as investors bear zero risks from IPO until acquisition. Post-acquisition, every investor is free to exit without losses, and accepting to be an owner of the new compa- ny with new management should be reward- ed in a standard risk-return framework. In conclusion, SPACs from IPO to acquisi- tion are completely risk-free; after that, they are not SPACs anymore. Those are the facts. Whitepaper SPACs 17